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Looking at the vast literature on the events of 1968 in various European countries, it is 
striking that the histories of '1968' of the Western and Eastern halves of the continent 
are largely still written separately.1 Nevertheless, despite the very different political 
and socio-economic contexts, the protest movements on both sides of the Iron Curtain 
shared a number of characteristics. The 1968 events in Czechoslovakia and Western 
Europe were, reduced to the basics, investigations into the possibility of marrying 
social justice with liberty, and thus reflected a tension within European Marxism. This 
essay provides an analysis specifically of the responses by the French left—the 
Communist Party, the student movements and the gauchistes—to the Prague Spring, 
characterised by misunderstandings and strategic appropriation. The Prague Spring 
was seen by both the reformist and the radical left in France as a moderate movement. 
This limited interpretation of the Prague Spring as a liberal democratic project 
continues to inform our memory of it. 
Grand narratives of '1968'  
 
One way to understand the continental scope of '1968', I propose, is by interpreting it 
as the culmination point of a set of challenges posed to the various traditions of 
European Marxism. The Prague Spring was in this sense the Czechoslovak variant of 
a European-wide phenomenon in the 1960s, namely, the emergence of hybrid, 
creative new strands of Marxist interpretation. In countries such as Italy, France, 
Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, the emergence of 'heterodox' or 'revisionist' 
interpretations of Marxism as of the early 1960s was related to generational change, 
the end of the post-war era and the weakening of political identities which based their 
legitimacy on anti-fascism and a specific interpretation of World War Two—such as 
state communism in the East and Soviet-aligned communism in the West. It was, 
further, a belated effect of the multiple disruptions of 1956, namely the de-
Stalinisation process and the Hungarian revolution and its suppression.2  
'1968' confronted the various traditions of the Marxist left in Europe with an issue it 
had long forgotten: liberty. A key and shared issue for all Prague Spring protagonists 
was how to marry social justice with liberty. The notion of liberty here included 
national liberty and national sovereignty, both with regard to the Soviet Union and in 
terms of relations between the Czech and Slovak nations; intellectual and creative 
liberty, including also the protection of individual liberties vis- -vis the state; political 
liberty, involving the central questions of overcoming the Stalinist past and 
establishing a form of political pluralism; and socio-economic liberty, including 
managerial autonomy, self-management for workers and the organisation of factory 
councils. Also in France, the re-emergence of liberty in Marxist debates and practice 
was a central feature of the 1968 events. This was clear not only from the students' 
and anarchists' fierce opposition to the Communist Party's authoritarianism, but also 
from the new left's investigations into libertarian interpretations of Marxism, and from 
the centrality of the notion of autogestion in the search for self-management and self-
control of industrial workers. 
Yet, these common themes shared by the 1968 protests in East and West are revealed 
only with hindsight; they are an analytical device rather than a reality actually 
experienced at the time. Responses to the Prague Spring by the various actors of the 
left in France in 1968 were characterised by misreadings, as the events were 
systematically and strategically interpreted through the lens of the dramatic domestic 
political developments. Misunderstandings of the Prague Spring occurred in all West 
European countries, but in Italy, for instance, the left as a whole showed itself more 
genuinely interested in the events and debates in Czechoslovakia (Bracke 2007, pp. 
167-75). France is an interesting case for contradictory reasons—on the one hand, the 
lack of genuine engagement with the Czechoslovak developments, and on the other 
hand, the broad instrumentalisation of these events in the context of the radical social 
and political battles at home. Before turning to these French perceptions, I will 
highlight a few aspects of the origins and developments of the Prague Spring which 
can illustrate the central concern of marrying social justice with liberty. 
'Against the dehumanising forces of capitalism, 
fascism and Stalinism': the nature of the Prague 
Spring  
Most of the recent literature on the 1968 events in Czechoslovakia has either not 
engaged with the political nature and ideological roots of the Prague Spring (dealing 
primarily with the conflict with the Soviet Union, or analysing power struggles within 
the Czechoslovak Communist Party (Komunistick  strana eskoslovenska, KS ) 
while dealing only to a limited extent with ideological debates in society at large),3 or 
has attempted to interpret the political agenda of the critical writers and playwrights 
such as V clav Havel and Ludv k Vacul k from a liberal, pro-Western perspective.4 
However, what is absent from recent narratives is a discussion of the kinds of 
Marxism to which the protagonists of the Prague Spring adhered.5 The most radical 
dimensions of the Prague Spring, I suggest, have been 'forgotten', not only because of 
the ideological ramifications of today's debates on Central and East European (CEE) 
history, but also because many observers in Western Europe at the time had an 
interest in presenting it as a liberal democratic project, as will be illustrated below for 
the case of France. 
In his 1971 study of the intellectual origins of the Prague Spring, Vladimir Kusin 
proposed that, reduced to its simplest dilemma, the Prague Spring was about 
developing 'a socially just form of democracy' (Kusin 1971, pp. 1-2). It was a context 
in which the nature of both socialism and democracy were being investigated, in a 
debate that, while not fully free, was significantly less constrained than it had been 
previously. However, what complicates our historical reading of the debates on 
socialism and democracy is the fact that the discourse of the 'deepening' or 'perfecting' 
of 'socialist democracy' was one that had been employed by the communists in power 
during the Novotn  period. From the late 1950s those breaking away from this 
discourse, such as Zden k Mlyn  and Ota ik, wished to reclaim both the words 
socialism and democracy because they firmly believed that these stood for something 
very different to what Czechoslovak neo-Stalinism had to offer. Yet, the confusion of 
terminology made it harder for their contemporaries in Czechoslovakia, as well as for 
analysts ever since, to distinguish between political views aimed at preserving the 
status quo, and those aimed at upsetting it. 
In addition, it may be objected that it was only due to (self-)censorship and (self-) 
discipline that the reform projects were couched in Marxist discourse, thus disguising 
an unspoken wish to abandon Marxist analysis. Censorship began to be relaxed in 
February 1968, and by late March censors had effectively ceased to exercise control, 
thus giving way to the emergence of 'public opinion as a powerful force' (Skilling 
1976).6 Admittedly, it is reasonable to assume that the formal abolition of censorship 
did not produce overnight the effect of an entire nation daring to and being capable of 
openly questioning the foundations of its political system and discourse. However, to 
present this as the only reason for the explicitly socialist nature of the reform ideas is 
to dismiss the importance of the Marxist tradition in Czechoslovakia. It will be 
illustrated here that for the various protagonists of the Prague Spring, Marxist 
discourse was not merely a tactical device, but rather a matter of critical investigation 
of its purpose and usefulness. 
Clearly, important differences existed between the various actors in terms of how they 
related to Marxism, not least between on the one hand, the reform communists in the 
leadership of the KS  such as Alexander Dub ek and Old ich ern k, and on the 
other hand, the intellectual leaders of the more critical movement of cultural revival, 
such as V clav Havel and Ludv k Vacul k.7 Nonetheless, all these Prague Spring 
protagonists shared a core of political values and intellectual legacies. A commitment 
to Marxism and a dislike and rejection of free-market capitalism were central 
characteristics of Czechoslovakia's political and intellectual cultures, and had been 
since the 1930s. The influence of Marxism as a political culture in 1960s 
Czechoslovakia was not directly affected by the de-legitimation of Stalinism. The 
rejection of Stalinism was unambiguous among the leaders of the revival movement, 
in public opinion at large, and even among the reform Communist Party leaders—
although, to be sure, a set of taboos remained in place which impeded an actual 
historical analysis of Stalinism. Still, cleansing Czechoslovak society and politics 
from the many remnants of Stalinism lies at the heart of the Prague Spring and was 
indeed one of the key unifying elements of often diverging agendas. However, for the 
leaders of the reform and revival movements this did not mean that rejecting 
Stalinism could be equated with rejecting Marxism and socialism. 
Re-interpretations of Marxism in Czechoslovakia found their origins in the years 
following 1956 in the debates among philosophers, writers and playwrights. As 
argued by James Satterwhite, a generation of philosophers and political theorists 
started utilising Marxism against the Party leadership—first cautiously, but towards 
1968 in more explicit terms (Satterwhite 2002, pp. 115-34). Writings by Karel Kos k 
and Ivan Svit k were especially innovative and politically influential. Kos k theorised 
the centrality of everyday, practical exchanges in man's existence and consciousness 
and attempted to create links between Marxism, phenomenology and existentialism. 
The influence of the French existentialists as well as Georg Luk cs were evident 
through his notion of 'dialectics of the concrete'. Praxis was given a humanist meaning 
reminiscent of Luk cs, understood as a creative way of living in the world. This 
discussion implied a fundamental critique of the Communist Party, though on the 
basis of a fresh Marxist analysis. Kos k discussed Communist Party ideology as a set 
of self-sufficient views, estranged from reality. Marxism, by contrast, was in his view 
the philosophical expression of the experiences of the working classes, a much more 
authentic reflection of actual, concrete life experiences. In the context of the Prague 
Spring, Kos k's emphasis on praxis and agency came to be interpreted as a powerful 
call to dissidence and action.8  
Innovative artists, intellectuals and writers, who were key in preparing the ground for 
the Prague Spring in the decade preceding it, also used Marxist methods to develop a 
critique of communist rule, by emphasising the political nature of artistic creation. 
Furthermore, the debates in the Writers' Union at the end of 1967, which directly 
prompted a change in the power relations within the KS  leadership and facilitated 
Dub ek's coming to power, reflected a re-investigation of Marxist methods as well as 
social concerns. Critical writers such as Anton n J. Liehm developed an attack on 
socialist realism in the arts, and new plays and novels no longer dealt primarily with 
Party heroes but with ordinary people with everyday feelings and dilemmas. 
Resistance to artistic dogma and calls for freedom of expression were the channels 
through which the Communist Party rule was criticised more generally. However, 
these were not calls for a 'neutral', value-free, or non-political form of art; quite to the 
contrary, the critics all emphasised the political role of art, in its duty to represent the 
concrete living conditions of ordinary people. As posed by Liehm, socialism needed 
to rid culture of 'two Diktats', those of power and those of the market, of arbitrary 
government and of liberalism. He further proposed that the political system should 
guarantee not only the individual freedom of creation, but also access to culture for all 
sections of the population in equal measure (Kusin 1971, pp. 57-58). 
Socio-economic liberty was debated through the ideas of self-management and 
factory councils. As early as 1957, a number of economic experts, among them future 
Prague Spring protagonist Ota ik, started to invoke Marx against (neo-)Stalinism, as 
well as to positively reassess aspects of Yugoslav 'revisionism'. By the mid-1960s, the 
Institute for Economics, led by ik, had become a creative laboratory for economic 
reform blueprints. Among the advocates of reform there was no general call for the 
abandoning of the planned economy; rather, debates and propositions were more 
complex, and can be summed up, as suggested by Skilling, as an investigation into 
'planned market socialism' (Skilling 1976, pp. 119-25). It was proposed that 
production plans should be more accurate and realistic, less prestige-oriented, less 
centralised, more diversified and devolved, and they should involve low-level 
decision making with participation from the various parties in the production units. 
One of ik's collaborators, estm r Ko u n k, critically explored the notion of 
socialisation of the means of production, and came to argue that ownership by the 
state did not mean collectivisation and that 'social ownership' should benefit all of 
society, the employees foremost (Kusin 1971, p. 86). Furthermore, the factory council 
experiments were central to economic reform in Czechoslovakia and also to debates 
in other East European countries and to the left in Western Europe. There was broad 
agreement among the reformers—including ik and Mlyn  among others—that 
making the planned economy more efficient should be accompanied by making it 
more democratic, by allowing for input into the organisation and planning of 
production not only by managers, but also by employees. While the April Programme 
announced the creation in the factories of 'democratic organs' representing the views 
and interests of the workers, it was only in June that a network of factory councils was 
established by the KS  throughout the country. However, a tension existed between 
more democratic views on what the factory councils should be, proposing 
authoritative organs through which workers would exercise a form of self-
management, and a more technocratic view, which preferred to see workers' control 
limited by managerial authority. While those focusing on greater managerial 
autonomy sought inspiration in Western social democracy, those privileging the 
theme of grassroots participation in the factories looked at alternative communist 
models, such as that of Yugoslavia (Skilling 1976, pp. 433-41). In the working class, 
the search for alternative ways of organising power relations on the factory floor was 
articulated through arguments in favour of greater trade union autonomy against the 
Soviet model of union subordination vis- -vis the Party (Gr mion 1985, pp. 40-42). 
While economic reform proved hardest to implement in practice, political reform was 
the area in which disagreements were most explicit, particularly in the weeks 
preceding the invasion. Most influential here was Zden k Mlyn , whose thinking 
from the late 1950s onwards centred on the role of the Party, both in relation to the 
masses and to the state. In the mid-1960s his ideas moved on rapidly, as he abandoned 
the vague notion of the 'masses' and developed a more complex vision of civil society 
as the locus of power. Modes of political representation became the key question, and 
as it was accepted now that there were different, sometimes conflicting, interests in 
society which all needed to be represented adequately,9 the debate came to hinge 
upon the issue of political pluralism. Notions of representation and participation were 
not limited to the Party. Other structures were envisaged, especially on the local and 
workplace levels, such as Mlyn 's notions of 'National Committees', which would 
have autonomy over a number of policy areas at the local level, and the 'working 
teams', which were to elect councils in workplaces (Kusin 1971, pp. 107-08, 115). 
Critiques of both the East European one party practice and the West European 
multiparty system were important. V nek ilh n for example, director of the 
Research Institute of the Economics of Industry and Construction and a strong 
advocate of economic and political reform, stated that the multiparty concept had also 
become obsolete in Western Europe. Free elections and the rotation of power between 
different parties in no way guaranteed the adequate representation of different 
interests, he argued (Skilling 1976, p. 439). Mlyn 's blueprint included the 
reinstatement of the National Front, no longer as the ossified mockery of pluralism 
which it had become under Stalinism, but as the centre of power, defining overall 
policy. It was to be made up of representatives of the Communist and other parties, as 
well as representatives of various social organisations, including trade unions and 
women's organisations. Yet, the role to be played by the Communist Party in this new 
political system remained the sore point. What was clear, however, was that in the 
context of rising political awareness, a majority in public opinion saw the 
development of a more democratic form of socialism as crucially dependent on the 
Communist Party's unambiguous abandonment of its power monopoly. According to 
an August 1968 opinion poll, 81% of respondents favoured the two formally 
recognised parties—the National Socialist Party ( eskoslovensk  strana n rodn  
socialistick ) and the People's Party ( eskoslovensk  strana lidov )—becoming 
'really autonomous' of and 'equal partners' to the KS  (Skilling 1976, p. 545).10  
Despite the increasingly outspoken critiques of the KS  reform leadership between 
April and July by the politicised sections of society, public opinion, according to polls 
taken between February and August, while increasingly critical of the Dub ek 
leadership, did continue to believe that the reforms would strengthen democracy.11 
The most visible expression of radicalisation outwith the Party was the creation of 
organisations which were commonly referred to as parties but were never recognised 
by the state as such. One example was KAN, the 'Club of Committed Non-Party 
members' (Klub anga ovan ch nestran k ), which defined its aims in its manifesto of 
May 1968 in terms of 'contributing to a new political system, never realised so far, of 
democratic socialism' (Navr til et al. 1988, pp. 156-58). It favoured a multiparty 
system and 'the defense of civil liberties' such as free speech. Its impact on public 
debate was reflected in the rapid growth of its membership, from 144 founding 
members to 3,000 on the eve of the invasion. KAN's founding manifesto offered 
elements for an investigation of the 'political, ethical and philosophical foundations' of 
the Czechoslovak nation and state. There were three such foundations, it was said, and 
they should form the basis of politics in Czechoslovakia because of their historical 
importance to its people. First, human and civil rights and civil equality (there was 
reference here to the United Nations as well as to the 'defence of these rights against 
the dehumanising forces of capitalism, fascism and Stalinism'). Secondly, the 
humanist tradition of Czechoslovak culture, 'which greatly inspired the advancement 
of our nations … rather than on the battlefield … or in multiplying material 
wellbeing'. The third principle was 'democratic socialism', which ought to be 
combined with 'the noble programme of individual freedom'. The Stalinist past was 
referred to as a 'violation in our national traditions of humanism, democracy and 
socialism' (Navr til et al. 1988, pp. 156-58). 
Tension between the Communist Party leadership and the intellectuals reached a 
boiling point at the time of the publication on 27 June 1968 of the 'Two Thousand 
Words Manifesto' by writer Ludv k Vacul k.12 The text proposed a powerful re-
interpretation of Czechoslovak post-war history, which diametrically opposed the 
official KS  narrative and expressed what many had quietly known: 'The first threat 
to our national life was from the war; then came other evil days and events that 
endangered the nation's spiritual wellbeing and character. Most of the nation 
welcomed the socialist program with high hopes, but it fell into the hands of the 
wrong people' (Navr til et al. 1988, p. 177). Vacul k voiced his anger at 20 years of 
(neo-)Stalinist rule in the most powerful way when he referred to the 
instrumentalisation of the notion of working class politics by the KS : 'The chief sin 
and deception of these rulers was to have explained their own whims as the “will of 
the workers”. … Every worker knows they had virtually no say in deciding anything' 
(Navr til et al. 1988, p. 178). Vacul k proposed that beyond the disputes between 
writers and Party leaders, the key force of change was located at the grassroots, 
among the masses of workers and ordinary people. 'The everyday quality of our future 
democracy depends on what happens in the factories and on what happens to the 
factories' (Navr til et al. 1988, p. 180). It is clear that even the most outspoken critics 
of Communist Party rule were unwilling to abandon the notion of a political 
legitimacy based on concern for social equality and on an investigation into the living 
and working conditions of ordinary people. 
'Everything remains to be imagined': interpretations 
on the French left  
Viewed in a longer-term historical interpretation of European Marxism, the 1968 
events in France, too, can be understood as the re-emergence of the question of liberty 
in relation to politics based on social justice. Yet, the differences between the ways in 
which some of these fundamental dilemmas of Marxism were articulated in France on 
the one hand and in Czechoslovakia on the other, and the very different political and 
socio-cultural contexts in which these debates were situated, gave rise to a number of 
misinterpretations. 'Socialism with a human face' as it was being debated in Prague, 
inspired the student radicals and small leftist parties ('gauchistes') only in a very 
limited way; and, as will be discussed below, Dub ek's reform communism presented 
the Parti communiste fran ais (PCF) with an embarrassment more than anything else. 
To the moderate socialist forces—the Section fran aise de l'internationale ouvri re 
(SFIO) and the newly formed F d ration de la gauche d mocratique et socialiste 
(FGDS)—the events in Czechoslovakia mattered only to the extent to which they 
impacted on their relations with the PCF. In sum, the French left understood little of 
the nature of the Prague Spring, projected its own conflicts and debates onto the 
events in Prague, and in some cases, although more so in the 1970s than in 1968, 
French responses to the Prague Spring were a matter of strategic appropriation.13  
Political discourse in France in the context of the student and worker protests between 
March and June hinged on the dichotomy of revolution versus reform. Reform was 
fiercely and unambiguously rejected by student protesters and radical leftist groups; 
instead, it was revolution that needed to be re-invented, re-invested and re-created. 
The rejection of reformism—which in this context could be defined as an 
institutionally managed transformation to socialism, in which a key role was reserved 
for political parties and trade unions, social bargaining and parliamentary action—was 
based on an analysis of the situation in Western Europe, and what was seen as the 
integration of the working classes into the capitalist system. Related to this were 
fierce critiques of the strategies of the traditional left, the communist and socialist 
parties and the trade unions connected to them. In a discursive context where 
'revolution' was the central object of both enquiry and desire, the KS  reformers, 
unlike Ho Chi Minh or Che Guevara, did not satisfy the need for charismatic leaders; 
and neither did the critical intellectuals of the revival movement, who were often 
portrayed as bourgeois thinkers disconnected from the working classes and ordinary 
people. One of the influential Trotskyist groups, Lutte ouvri re, largely dismissed the 
KS 's attempts at reform of the existing system, and its weekly paper stated that the 
Prague Spring was 'not likely to develop into a genuine situation of revolutionary 
socialism'. It qualified the Prague Spring as: 'limited by the popular strata it represents 
as well as by its political content', and as nationalist and chauvinist. The paper in early 
July still considered it very unlikely that the Soviet Union would put an end to the 
Prague Spring by military means, as there were 'no signs of popular revolt'.14  
One issue which did receive attention in France during May and June 1968, was the 
factory councils. However, the fact that the council movement in Czechoslovakia—
very differently to what had happened in Hungary in 1956—was largely a KS  
initiative, made it hard for the gauchistes to relate to it, and led once more to 
misunderstandings. The notion of factory councils was loaded with historical 
significance in the French left, related as it was to the Paris Commune of 1871. The 
Trotskyist groups specifically placed it at the centre of their political discourse in 
1968, linking it to autogestion and the working classes' appropriation of full control 
over the production process, thus placing it in a revolutionary, workerist tradition. 
Quite distinctly, the 'new left', the Parti socialiste unifi  (PSU) and the left-catholic 
trade union Conf d ration fran aise d mocratique du travail (CFDT), invented a 
new meaning for it, as part of what was presented as a new model of democratic 
socialism different to both Stalinism and social democracy. Here, factory councils 
were invoked as a crucial dimension of participatory democracy, and a necessary 
compensation for the limitations of representative parliamentarism. While the popular 
student leader Daniel Cohn-Bendit often referred to the revolutionary nature of 
factory councils, including also those in Czechoslovakia, other student leaders and 
intellectuals, such as Cornelius Castoriadis, noted the limited role played by the 
working classes in the Czechoslovak factory councils.15 To all these groups, their 
support or lack thereof for the councils in Czechoslovakia was largely rhetorical and 
functional to their political legitimacy and symbolic battles at home, rather than an 
actual investigation of their nature. 
It was sections of what is referred to here as the 'new left', which attempted to 
politically appropriate the Prague Spring, primarily in its dimension of cultural 
revival. The newspaper which identified most with the PSU and the new left, the daily 
Le nouvel observateur, noted and positively appreciated elements of a liberal-
bourgeois democratic tradition in the Prague Spring.16 It expected the emerging of 
this tradition to be the outcome of the debates between Dub ek and the critical revival 
movement. Le nouvel observateur's analysis of harmonious relations between the 
reform communists and the critical intellectuals, against conservatives in the KS  
(Held 1968), was largely a mistaken one and the fruit of wishful thinking. It was 
motivated by a wish to have an impact on the situation of the French left and in the 
PCF more specifically, and implied a critique of the (neo-)Stalinists in the PCF and 
support for those who were seen as the Party's more progressive, moderate leaders, 
such as General Secretary Waldeck Rochet. The Prague Spring was seen by both the 
PSU and Le nouvel observateur as a model of democratic socialism, to be followed in 
France through the coming to power of a broad left-of-centre alliance, reformist but 
also modern and in touch with young people's critiques and movements. As the only 
ideological current in the French left, Le nouvel observateur perceived connections 
between the 1968 events in Western and Eastern Europe, and situated them in the 
global Cold War context. It wished to see the Prague Spring as the herald of a new 
international and European order that would help to undermine the existing 'social and 
political status quo' in Europe and the static bipolar world, characterised by 
superpower hegemony over the old continent: 
They [the Prague Spring protagonists] resemble the French revolutionaries of 
May … The Czechoslovak reformers know that they find themselves in terra 
incognita. Everything remains to be imagined and constructed … The world divided 
between neo-capitalists and neo-Stalinists risks one day to be upset by this, and in a 
good way. (Held 1968) 
Ironically, thus, both the 'far left' and the 'new left' interpreted the Prague Spring as a 
reformist movement that was moving towards the adoption of market-based social 
democracy—but did so with different degrees of enthusiasm. It was this discursive 
context which placed the leadership of the French Communist Party (PCF) in a 
position from which it was forced to defend the revolutionary (rather than reformist) 
nature of the Prague Spring, without, however, ever being convinced of this. The PCF 
was traditionally very loyal to the USSR although since 1964, under the leadership of 
Waldeck Rochet, it had given some proof of a cautious distancing from Moscow.17 
Now it experienced much difficulty in defining what the Prague Spring was and how 
it related to Soviet-style 'orthodoxy'. Thus, the PCF's responses to Dub ek's changes 
between January and April shifted between lack of interest and tolerance vis- -vis 
certain aspects of it, and a taboo on the questions it raised regarding de-Stalinisation. 
In so far as the PCF leadership did lend its support to the Prague Spring, it was 
formalistic rather than substantial, that is to say, motivated by a willingness to defend 
the formal principles of party autonomy and state sovereignty. At no point did the 
PCF take the Prague Spring as an example for its own policies, and the Party refused 
to allow the changes in Czechoslovakia to lead to a wider debate on socialism and 
democracy, in contrast to, for example, currents within the Italian Communist Party 
(Partita Comunista Italiano, PCI) (Bracke 2007, pp. 167-75). 
While the PCF's daily paper Humanit  did carefully hint at some of the structural 
problems of the Czechoslovak communist system which had provoked the leadership 
change in the KS  (economic recession, the Slovak question and need for a 
separation of party and state institutions), the fundamentally new character of Dub
ek's policies was consciously ignored.18 One reason why the PCF needed to 
emphasise the continuum between Soviet-style communism and Dub ek's 'socialism 
with a human face' was the taboo on Stalinism. For a party which itself had failed to 
carry out a consistent de-Stalinisation, either organisationally or ideologically, it was 
impossible to discuss the rejection of Stalinism as a key motive behind Dub ek's 
reforms. In early April the PCF Secr tariat dryly noted that the KS 's April 
Programme 'ought to be considered positive'; not, however, for the innovations it was 
expected to bring about, but because it allegedly showed Dub ek's readiness to 
combat 'certain attempts to threaten socialism'.19 Indeed, if support for Dub ek was 
never more than lukewarm, the PCF leadership had little or no confidence in the 
socialist credentials of the intellectuals of the revival movement. As of April, the 
'danger of the rightist forces' was increasingly stressed. For example, Humanit  
referred to instances of criticism of Prime Minister ern k which had appeared in 
Rud  pr vo, as a dangerous case of 'the political debate becoming personal' 
(Acquaviva 1968, p. 3). The 'Two Thousand Words Manifesto' was largely ignored by 
the PCF press, thus indicating the Party's disagreement with it (Deli 1981, p. 94). 
As the intellectuals' criticisms of Dub ek mounted towards the summer, so did the 
PCF's attempts at discrediting them, and their veiled yet clear warnings to the KS  to 
regain control over civil society. In old-fashioned Leninist style, the PCF press 
reminded the Czechoslovak communists of the 'leading role of the Communist Party' 
when reporting the developments in Prague (Hentg s 1968b, p. 3). Internally, the PCF 
leadership was, in fact, even more preoccupied with the 'rightist' dimensions of the 
Prague Spring than it would seem from its public statements. In an elaborate Bureau 
politique report, for internal discussion only, PCF envoy to Prague, Philippa Hentg s, 
emphasised the country's economic problems, as well as its request for a loan from 
West Germany. According to this analysis, there were further negative points also: the 
increasing influence of the 'petty bourgeoisie'; the 'fascination with the West in certain 
layers of the population'; disagreements in the leading organs of the KS  on issues 
such as the economic programme; and political opposition ('problems created by the 
adversary').20 Thus, when General Secretary Waldeck Rochet went to speak to Dub
ek in Prague on 19 July, following his meeting with Soviet leaders in Moscow, he did 
so not because he wished to 'save' the Prague Spring, as some of the literature has 
argued, but with an urgent request to undo the Prague Spring reforms and re-establish 
full Communist Party control, as the only way to avoid a now near-certain invasion.21  
While the Party line was one which at all times abstained from genuine support for 
the experiment in 'socialism with a human face', a number of intellectuals connected 
to the PCF appropriated the project, invoking it as a useful example for the 
development of democratic socialism. In doing so, their aim was to provoke debate 
and changes within the PCF. Philosopher Roger Garaudy saw connections between 
the intellectual revival in Czechoslovakia and his own exploration of the humanistic 
and democratic character of Marxism. The Action Programme seemed to confirm his 
view that both the notion of class and the leading role of the Communist Party needed 
to be reconsidered (Gr mion 1985; Streiff 2001, p. 500). The intellectuals connected 
to the journal Les lettres francaises, Pierre Daix and Louis Aragon in particular, 
granted extensive attention to the cultural revival—although they too abstained from 
publishing the 'Two Thousand Words Manifesto'. Their points of reference in 
Czechoslovakia were not the Party leaders but rather the critical writers and the 
journal Liter rn  listy. Daix in his Journal de Prague discussed the problems of the 
Novotn  regime (which he labelled as 'absolute monarchy centralism') and the ways 
in which it was criticised in the liberalised political climate. He wrote at length on the 
issue of the Stalinist trials, and denounced the 'demagogic workerism' of pre-1968 
Czechoslovakia, which, according to him, 'did not correspond to the ideal of 
socialism'.22 All this sounded like criticism of the PCF itself, motivated by the hope 
to see a change from within its structures, as seemed to have occurred in the KS . 
The Prague Spring and its contested memory  
 
The above analysis does not explain why the Prague Spring, and particularly certain 
aspects of it such as the factory councils, acquired the status of myth on the left in 
France and elsewhere in Western Europe. In fact, it was only after the Soviet-led 
invasion of August 1968 that the Prague Spring, misrepresented if represented at all 
before August, was appropriated by the various sections of the French left, which thus 
also backdated their own support for it. The Prague Spring became in the 1970s a 
standard weapon in the historical and political arsenal of the communist, socialist and 
intellectual left in France. While the factory councils started to receive much more 
attention among French intellectuals, such as Andr  Gorz, in 1969, it was only in the 
mid-1970s that the two major parties of the left, the PCF and the Nouveau PS led by 
Fran ois Mitterrand, rediscovered the Prague Spring and invested it with symbolic 
and identitarian meaning. This, as analysed by Gr mion, took place in the context of 
their bid for governmental power through the Union de la gauche, and the urgent need 
for a shared model or point of reference that could clarify what the two parties meant 
by 'democratic socialism' (Gr mion 1985, pp. 199-234). Internationally, the re-
appropriation took place in the context of the rise and fall of Eurocommunism in 
1974-1977, during which the Spanish and Italian Communist Party leaderships often 
referred to the Prague Spring as their preferred model for socialism—in a way that 
was significantly more genuine than was the case for the PCF leadership of George 
Marchais. 
This belated identification with the Prague Spring took place in the wider context of 
discrediting of the most radical political agendas of Mai '68—by a conservative 
backlash, by the PCF and PS, and by some former soixante-huitards themselves. As a 
result, the Prague Spring now needed to be presented as a fully social democratic and 
reformist project, a perspective that has remained the predominant one in Europe 
generally, particularly since the collapse of Soviet-style communism between 1989 
and 1991. Current academic and public debate on the history of Central and East 
Europe under communism seems to be dominated largely by a grand narrative 
according to which all dissident and even reform movements expressed the wish to 
adopt liberal-democratic and free-market values. The history of political conflict in 
CEE is thus reduced to a teleologically inspired story of these societies' inevitable 
adoption of a 'West European' political and socio-economic model, through what has 
been called a 'rectifying revolution' (Habermas 1990). While this interpretation holds 
for some of the dissident movements in CEE, the history of opposition movements to 
Soviet-style communism is, as it is argued here in relation to the Prague Spring, far 
more complex. Investigations of reform as well as dissident movements in CEE 
during communism can only benefit from an understanding of how they related to the 
traditions of European Marxism. 
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Notes  
In the English-language literature, 'the sixties' as an object of study usually refers 
primarily to the industrialised Western world. Developments in Eastern Europe are 
either not included or when they are analysed they often do not have a significant 
impact on the overall line of argument. A recent example is Schildt and Siegfried 
(2006). 
On the importance of the 1956 events to the emergence of dissident Marxism in 
Czechoslovakia, see Kusin (1971, pp. 19-27). 
This is the case for, for example, the studies by Mark Kramer and Kieran Williams 
(Kramer 1998, pp. 111-71; Williams 1997). 
See for example Keane (1999). However, in earlier work, Keane has interpreted 
Havel and Charter 77 as expressing the ideals of democratic socialism (Keane 1985, 
pp. 7-9). 
A useful exception is Tucker's discussion of the philosophical foundations of the 
Czech dissident movement post-1968; he asserts that it would be a mistake to 
understand Czech dissidents as 'ardent anti-communists' (Tucker 2000, pp. 9-10). 
For more on the end of censorship and the development of the press, see Skilling 
(1976, pp. 196-201). 
I follow here the broad consensus in the literature on the Prague Spring as consisting 
of two dimensions: a top-down, Communist Party-led reform movement, and a more 
spontaneous bottom-up movement of cultural and intellectual revival. 
See for example his article 'Na e nyn j  krize', published in Liter rn  listy in April 
1968 (Kos k 1968). 
See for example ik's view in his influential work Economics, Interests, Politics 
(1962), that 'society is the assertion of interests of one social group against the 
interests of another' (quoted in Kusin 1971, p. 102). 
On the interpretation of these polls and their shortcomings, see Skilling (1976, pp. 
528-32). 
This was the answer given by 88% of respondents in a poll in late March (Skilling 
1976, p. 41). 
The 2,000 words referred to 'Two Thousand Words that belong to Workers, Farmers, 
Officials, Scientists, Artists and Everybody'. The manifesto is reproduced in Navr til 
et al. (1988, pp. 177-81). 
I am here largely in agreement with the general argument in Gr mion (1985). 
All quotes from 'Menaces sovi tiques contre la Tch coslovaquie', Lutte ouvri re, 3 
July 1968, p. 1. All translations from French primary sources are the author's. 
More details are given in Gr mion (1985, pp. 110-16). 
Elements of this can be seen in Lentin (1968) and Held (1968). 
For more detail see Bracke (2007, pp. 117-20). 
See for example Acquaviva (1968, p. 3). On PCF coverage of the Prague Spring, see 
also Daix (1980, p. 242). 
Archives Parti communiste fran ais (Place Colonel Fabien, Paris), box Secr tariat 
(agenda and conclusions), 2 April 1968. 
See Hentg s (1968b); Archives PCF, box 'Tch coslovaquie—Plissonnier', folder III, 
file 2. 
More detail in Bracke (2007, pp. 162-65). I disagree here with Vigreux (2000), who 
sees Rochet's 'parallel diplomacy' as illustrative of his support for Dub ek. 
 
